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Quantity and Elasticity Spillovers Onto the Labor Market:
Theory and Evidence on Sluggishness
ABSTRACT
FirmsT beliefs that they maybeunable to sell as much as they would
like at the market price leads not only to aquantity spillover (even when
prices are flexible) but also to a spillover of product demand elasticity
onto the elasticity of labor demand. Hence, optimal firm behaviorcan be
expected to produce a negative correlation between the (absolute value of)
the wage elasticity and the unemployment rate. Thishypothesis is tested
on three sets of data.1) For low—skilled workers in the United States
in 1969 there is weak support for this hypothesis; 2)In time—series
data for the U.S. there is no evidence for the hypothesis (thereis essen-
tiallyno cyclical variability in the elasticity); and 3) In time—series
data for the United Kingdom there is fairlystrong evidence supporting it.
We also find that, in both the U.S. and the U.K., the demandelasticity
for labor decreased in the 1970s to an extent that does notappear to be
explained by changes in other factor prices.
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Theories that view unemployment as a non—market—clearing or non—Walrasian
phenomenon assign a central role to spiliovers from product markets onto the
labor market. Consider a profit—maximizing firm which faces a constraint on the
amount of output it can sell. This constraint in turn affects its demand for
lahor, with decreased product demand spilling over onto decreaned demand for
labor. Unemployment results if the constrained demand for labor is less than
desired supply.
Jhy, however, don't unemployed workers respond to constraints on demand for
labor by offering to work at lower wages? The effectiveness of such a response
will depend on the elasticity of demand for labor which workers face. For the
quaritity constraint on the output market to appear in the labor market in the
form of unemployment, the elasticity of demand for labor must be low.In short,
ifwe areto explain unemployment in terms of a spillover of product market con-
ditionsonto the labor market when prices are not fixed, a fall in the elasti-
cityof demand for labor must accompany an observed increase in unemployment.
iflthispaper we presenit theoretical and empirical results supporting
simultaneous movements of the elasticity of labor demand and the unemployment
rate.We begintheoretically byconsidering a representative firm that faces
constraints on the amount it can sell, but that is able to lower its selling
price in the attempt to "loosen" these constraints. Optimal behavior has two
imp]!cations.First, the extent to which an adverse shift in demand conditions
facingthe firm actually shows up in lower sales (andhence lower iuantity of labor
demanded) will depend on the elasticity of demand. With prices flexible, quantity
spillovers clearly depend on a low elasticity of product demand. We also show that,
for a firm facing a downward—sloping demand curve, there is a positive relation between—2—
its elasticity of demand for labor and the elasticity of product demand that it
faces. Analogous to a quantity spillover there is an "elasticity spillover."
Taken together these results imply that a low elasticity of product demand
willyield both a low level and a low elasticity of labor demand. We call this
the variable employment elasticity (VEL) hypothesis. High unemployment will he
accompanied byalow elasticity of demand for labor. The labor market con-
ditionswhichimply the ineffectiveness of wage cutting in response to
unemploymentthemselves result from the dependence of factor demand on demand
foroutput.
In the second through fourth sections of the paper we presentempirical
evidence to test our theoretical consiusions. Cross—section data on low—
skilled workers in the U.S. are examined first; then time—series evidence on
labor demand in the U.S. and the U.K. is considered. As part of these last
results we examine whether there has been a structural change in the elastLcity
of demand for labor.
I. The Theory of Derived Demand for Labor in a Non—Wairasiari World
For a profit—maximizing seller,whatisthe relation between conditions in
theoutputrriarket anddemandfor labor?If, following the basic quantity—
constrained models, we assume that prices are exogenously fixed at a level which
is not market clearing, the answer is simpleJ Suppose that at the given price
desired demand for output exceeds desired supply. Actual sales will bedeter-
mined by the minimum of these two, and any resulting constraint on output and
productionwill Imply a cutback in demand for labor. In such a model the
elasticity of labor demand has little meaning: Labor demand is determined solely
by the exogeneously determined demand for final output.—3—
Ashas often been pointed out, a firm which can hold inventories will not
have a mechanical relation between current sales and current production.
However, the basic result of a spillover should continue to hold for two
reasons. First, an increased constraint on current sales may lead the firm to
expect increased constraints on future sales. Second, even with unchanged
future sales expectations, the value of inventories will he concave in their
level, meaning inventories will notincreasesufficiently tomake up for a
decreasein current sales.
it is unreasonable to assume, however, that a seller facing a constraint on
product demand will not consider cutting price. Hore likely, he will lower his
selling price relative to •the price he sees in the market inan atteopt to
increase sales. The amount by which he lowers price will depend onthe demand
curvehe faces.
The standard theory of the competitive firm views each seller as facing an
infinitely elastic product demand for his own output, since a small cut in price
willinducean arbitrarily large increase in quantity demanded. If this were
the case, then sales constraints inthe sense discussed above could not be an
ecluilLbriwaphenomenon.Individualbehaviorwouldalways lead to a situta—
tionwhere price equalled marginal cost. Nor would the notionof unemployment
caused by spill—oversonto labor demand make any sense, since the firm could
always sell as raich as itlikes at the going market price.
Foranumber of reasons, it maybeunrealistic to assume that sellers face
aninfinitely elastic demand curve for their product in the short run. This may
bedueto the monopoly power that a seller enjoys with respecttohis current_)4_
customers,possibly arising from spatial separation (see Hotelling, 1929); or
one may argue that, because information about price changes diffuses only over
time, an individual seller maychargea price above or below that which other
sellers of the same product charge, without his market share going to zero or
one instantaneously. (The optimal pricing policy for an atomistic seller in a
world where customers are gained or lost only slowly in response to price dif-
ferentials was studied by Phelps and Winter, 1910.) In the short run the impli-
cation of slow diffusion ofpriceinformation isthatthe individual firm acts
likea monopolist facing a downward sloping demand curve. The firrnt s demand
curve will depend on the industry demand curve and on the technical specifica-
tionof customer flow between firms.
Consider the employment decisions of a firm which, because of the sort of
frictions mentioned above, faces a downward sloping demand curve. What will be
the relation between the elasticity of this demand curve and the level and
elasticity of demand for labor? Other things equal, the steeper is the product
demand curve, the more an inward shift of the curve will be reflected in a fall
in desired level of output implying a fall in employment. The less effective
are price cuts in response to a fall in demand, the more this fall in demand
will be reflected in quantity produced.
This basic result lies at the heart of the concept of quantity spillovers
when prices are flexible. In a world of fixed prices, adjustments in quantity
of input demanded are the only possible response to a fall in product demand.
Flexible prices add a second margin of adjustment. The firm will find it opti-
mal to use both margins, and the degree to which quantity spillovers appear will
depend on how elastic is the demand curve that firms face. A necessary con-
dition for spillover unemployment to appear is that firms act as if they face
inelastic demand curves.—5—
Onecan make a further statement which is somewhat less obvious. Suppose
that, when the level of demand for output falls, the elasticity of demand for
output falls as well. This will tend to reinforce the quantity spillover
effect.The greater is the simultaneous movement in the level and elasticity of
product demand, the more a fall in demand for output will he reflected in a fall
in demand for labor, and the less in a fall in price.
Why might one expect a reduction in the elasticity of product demand to
coincide with a fall in demand? When demand falls, price cuts may lead to a
reduetion in the expected rate of inflation; expected real interest rates rise.
Thusa price decline, byreducing the expected rate of future price increases,
could lead to an actual reduction in quantity demanded.
Why else might one expect this? Phenomena such as pessimism about future
income streams may lead demanders both to cut their current consumption and to
become less responsive to price cuts by sellers. Consider a consumer whose
employment is constrained in the current period and who has a subjective proba-
bility distribution over the amount of labor he will be able to sell in the
future. One can show (Drazen, 1980b) that, if his utility function displays
decreasing relative risk aversion, an adverse shift in the distribution of
future income will cause both the level of consumption and the price elasticity
of demand to fall. That is, if the utility function is such that saving
increases with uncertainty about future income, lower expected future income
causes saving to rise and causes the consumer to be less sensitive to price cuts.
Some rough intuition for this result is as follows. Since a fall in income
increases risk aversion, the individual requires a larger premium to undertake a
given risk. Because future income is risky, increasing consumption today—6—
increasestheriskassociated with future utility due to the impliedfiture
incomestreaci, ?herefore, a larger decrease in price (which may be seenas a
riskpremium in this case) may he necessary to induce an individual to increase
his consumption by a given amount. In other words, the price elasticity of out-
putdemand falls.
Toderive the relation between product market conditionsand the elasticity
oflahor demand, uc turn to a formal model. Consider a firmwhich produces a
singleproduct that may either be sold in the current Ieriod or stored (without
stor'age costs) and sold next period. For simplicity we assume all produetLori takes
placein the current period, though this assumption could easily be relaxed
without affecting the basic results.Outputis a function of two factors of
production,£ (labor)and m (a corposite of other factors), combined according
to f(9.,u). The firm facesdownward sloping demand curves in eacb period, each
ofwhich is a function only of that period's price.(This simplification couldalso
be relaxed). This period's demand function is x(p), and next period's
is x(),where p isthe current discounted value of next period's price.





subjectto x(p) +x(p)=f(t,rn). (2)
wz andWaarethe prices of the two factors, whichthefirm takes as given. The
maximization yields first—order conditions:




and x/x' +p=x/x'+p (6)
x'andx', arethe price derivatives of theproduct denand curves, and L and
are the iiarginal products of £ and m.
rp0solvefor the dependence of the elasticity of dei:and for labor on the
elasticity of product denxd, we differentiate equations (3)—(6)withrespect to









Ifwe assurie that the production function is homogeneous of degree one,
this yields:
CL(i—a) +a[—-(r—l) +4(—l)1 (8)
wheree elasticity of demand. for labor.
a=—, labor'sshare of total factor payments;
f
=elasticityof substitution between factors;
=— — elasticityof current product demand;—8—
Ti =elasticityof future product demand;
and K= fractionof total output going to current sales.
x+x
Toevaluate equation (8)furtherconsidera specific functional form,the
constant elasticity demand function, x hp, whereh is aconstant. a is then
equalto ,and(8)becomes:
=(1—a)o+ a1KT1 + (i —K)fl I (9)
Whenx" and x" aresmall relative to x' and x', ax' =ax' 2, so that (8)becomes:
=(i—a)+af-(n —1)+2- ( ')] (9')
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Equation(9') gives a complete characterization of the determinants of the
elasticity of demand for a factor in a non—Wairasian world. This elasticity
is the weighted sum of the elasticity of factor substitution arid the
elasticity of product demand.2 The latter is in turn a weighted sum of product
demand elasticities in current and future periods. If output price were exoge—
nously fixed, such that the elasticity of product demand were zero, the second
term in (9)woulddrop out, leaving onlythestandard substitution elasticity
term, (1 —a).
Whenprices are flexible, the elasticity of input demand is always
higher than in the fixed price world, as indicated by the presence of the second
set of terms in (9).Theinfluence of current product demand elasticity will
depend on the fraction of output going to current sales. As is intuitive, the
longer the horizon the firm has, the less a low value of current product demand—9-.
elasticitywill affect demand for inputs. For given values of K,theelasticity
offactor demand will be higher the larger is ninthe region of possible price
changes. The firmwillbemoreresponsive to offered wagecutsby laborthe
moreable it is to sell the output which would be produced by the extra labor
hired(or, more precisely, the more ableit is to sell the output without, the
necessity of a large price cut).
Our argument here maybesummarized as follows. Theamountby which a firm
increasesthe quantity of labor demanded in response to a wage cut will depend
onthe value of the output which would be produced. This output has two uses,
current sales and inventory. If the firm's sales prospects worsen, and if the
value of inventory is concave in inventory, the firmwillrequire a larger fall
inwagesto induce it to increase output by a given amount. That is, the larger
the price cut necessary to sell the increased output, the larger the wage cut
necessary to induce the firm to hire more labor.
We have attempted here to bring together a number of relatively obvious
points to come to some not so obvious conclusions. Facing constraints on sales,
a firm will choose an optimal point along a downward sloping demand curve. The
factor demand functions of the firm will depend heavilyon the elasticity of
this demand curve. A low elasticity of product demand (which, for reasons
discussed above, may be reasonable to expect when aggregate demand is low) will
leadto both a low level of factor demand and a lowelasticity of factor demand.
Hence,if the firm is in a non—Wairasian environment in product markets, we
might expect high unemployment and a low elasticity of demand for labor to
go together. In our empirical work we call this expectation the variable
employment elasticity (VEE) hypothesis. It is worth noting that the assumption
of exogenous wage rigidity does not readily generate any hypothesis about
cyclical variations in labor—demand elasticities.—10—
II.Cross Section Demand: Low—Skilled Workers, 1969
In this and the next two sections we turn to empirical testing of the VEE
hypothesis on the demand for labor. The procedure is to take different data
setsand specify standard labordemand equations including the real wage and
output. To these are added a measure of aggregate slackness and interactions
of this measure and the real wage. Theinteraction terms allow the direct
testingof our hypothesis; they should havepositive effects on employment
demandtobe consistent with our hypothesis.
Any data set on a subaggregate of workers to be used in testing the impli-
cations of our hypothesis should meet two criteria. First, the workers should
he affected by market forces; i.e., they should not be in a subrnarket in which
wage determination is almost entirely through collective bargaining. Second,
variations in aggregate activity should be reflected in employment patterns in
this submarket. Employment in this group should neither be so steady and high
that differences inlabormarket conditions do not produce variations in labor
demandfor this group, nor should it be so steady and lOWthat even a low aggre-
gate unemployment rateis accompanied by slack in the particular submarket.
Theseconsiderations suggest using data on a broad range of low—skilled
individuals; this ensures that the impact of rigidities produced by unioniza-
tionis minor and allows a sufficient range of occupations so thatvariations in
aggregate activity can be expected to produce tightness in some submarkets.
Crandell, MacRae and Yap (1975) estimate a cross—section labor—demand equation
for the low—skilled (service, private household workers and nonfarm laborers) as
part of a larger supply—demandsystem. Their data cover 43states and com-
binations of states. The wage and employment data are from the March 1969—11—
Current Population Survey; the output data are based on Bureau of Economic
Analysis estimates of income originating by sector. The unemploymentvariable
whichwe have added is the deviation of the total unemployment rube in 1969 in
thestate from its average valuefor l96O—l969.Thismeasure, UDEV, captures
the labor market disequilihium implicit in the theoretical discussion Lctber
that would the current unemployment rate.
The first column in Table 1 presents instrumental estimatesof a simple
demandequation for hoursworked by low—skilled labor. WL isthe log of the
averagewage, calculated as the ratio of'laborincome to hours worked by low—
skilled labor;QNPR is the log of nonfariti output other than in industrial sec-
tors (designed to reflect output in sectors that are intensive in low—skilled
labor).The equation was estitiateci using a broad array of demographic variables
asinstruments in the prediction of '1L.5The underlying data we shall use in
examininghow slackness affects labor demandproducesensible estimates of this
standarddemand equation. The wage elasticity seems reasonable for low—skilled
workers (see Hamerriiesh—Grant, 1919); and, while the output elasticity is not
consistent with the increasing returns to scale implied by most tine—series
labor—demand equations (see Hamermesh, 1916), it is completely consistentwith
constantreturns to scale.
In column (2) we presentthe results of interacting W1 with UDEV and
including UDEV alone in this equation. Because of the collinearity induced
bythe inclusion of UDEV in both simple and interactive form, the t—statistics are
quite small. However, the interaction term is positive, confirming our bypothe——12—
TABLE 1
Demand forLow—Skilled Hours, Current Population Survey
Data for States, 1969, Instrumental Estirnatesa
(1) (2) (3)
Constant —2.20 —2.76 —2.88
(—10.31) (—5.o) (—5.05)
WL —•95 ..L —.22
(—3.62) (—.y) (—.31)
WL UDEY .bo .61
(.86) (.96)








at—statistics in parentheses here and in Tables 2—5.sis thatfactor demandelasticities are lower where there is greater slack in the
factormarket.Moreover, it remains pocitive whenanadditional interacLion
terra,between output (QMPR) and UDEV, is added to the equation in column (3).
It is also interesting to note that this second interaction is negative:
Increases in output in slack tiraes induce smaller increases in erapboymeni
demand. This is consistent with the viewthat employers canexpand output
during slack times partly by using labor they had previously hoarded.
To examine the intrasauple variation in the wage and output elasticities
using the estimates in Table I, wepresent inTable 2 their values calculated at
the sample mean and extremes of UDEV. Because the 1960s vere a period of
declining unemployment in the United States, UDEV has a negative mean, and its
raaxirmarnamong the states in the sample iszero. As the first row of Table 2
shows,the wage elasticity varies greatly across states in thesar.ipledepending
upon the degree of labor—market slack. Indeed, in theloosestlabor market in
the sample the elasticity is insignificantly differentfrom zero. Obversely,
theelasticity in the labor market whose unemployment rate had fallen most
rapidly during the1960sis both large and significantly different from the mean
elasticity. There is imich lessvariation in the output elasticity as labor—
market tightness varies, as thesecond row of Table 2 shows, and the differences
in this elasticity among states are insignificant.
Though theinteraction terms that explicitly test our hypothesis are them-
selves not significant in the estimates presented in Table 1, thereis a signi-
ficant difference between the wag-c elasticities calculated for the two states
with the highest and lowest temporary unemployment. This suggests that this
cross—section provides at least some weak evidence in support of our proposition
that optimizing behavior leads employers to be less responsive to variations in
factor prices when markets are slack.—l4 —
TABLE2
Elasticitiesof Low—Wage Employment, Basedon
Table1, Equation (3)
tJDEVMinimum Mean Maximum
(—3. percent) (—i.ii percent) (0 percent)
MHL/MWL —2.28 —.90 —.22
(-1.51) (-3.28) (-.31)
MHL/MQNPR 1.13 1.02 .91
(5.52) (18.12) (i.)—15—
III.Time—Series Labor Demand in the United States, l95—l980
The plethora of studies estimating labor—demand equations using time—series
data has led to a number of firm conclusions: 1) The elasticity with respect
to output is less than one; there is thus substantial evidence of short—run
increasing returns to scale; 2) The implied wage elasticity is well below one,
thoughsome recent evidence suggests it may beas high as .6;3) The averagelag
ofemployment in response to exogenous changes in wages or output demandexceeds
that of manhours; 4) Versions of employment—demand equations that constrain the
response of employment demand to relative factor prices to be homogeneous yield
implausibly low estimated elasticities.6 Despite this consensus and the massive
array of studies there have been no estimates of how the wage elasticities
differ at different points of the business cycles.1
We use aggregate data for United States manufacturing, quarterly for 19514
through 1980:11, to test the VEE hypothesis. In the basic version the equation
to be estimated is:
3 3
Nt =a+ a11Wti+ a3 Qt—i +bt , (10) i=0 i=0
whereN =number(manhours) of production workers; W =averagehourly earnings
deflated by the FF1 for manufacturing; Q =manufacturers'shipments, also
deflated by the FF1. (The variables are written in logs.) Four—quarter distri-
buted lags were used because they produced better fits than did lags of other
length. All equations were estimated using the Cochrane—Orcutt technique for
estimating the parameter p describing a first—order autoregression in the
errors.—16—
Equation (10) is estimated using quadratic polynomial distributed lags,
withoutconstraints on thedistant end—points in the lag structure. 'The results
shownincolumns (1)and ()ofTable 3 make clear that thewage elasticity is
relatively low, though of similar magnitude to that produced in many other time—
serieslabor—demand studies. Thecoefficientson the trend imply a somewhat
lower rate of increase in labor productivity than actually occurred, though.8
In columns (2) and (5)wepresent the estimates of a version of (10) that includes
interactionsbetween the wage terms and UlI, the unemployment rate of males
25—5-. (This latter variable is also included separately.) The prime—age male
unemployment rate is used to give a measure of labor—market slack that has been
relatively invariant to the changes in labor force participation and population
trends that have altered the meaning of the aggregate unemployment rate, The
sum of the coefficients on the interaction terms is negative, but not significantly
different from zero. In the U.S. time series we fail to find corroborating evidence
for our hypothesis. As we show below, this is not due to our failure to include
other factor prices, such as that of enerr.
The initial and long—run enloyment—wage and manhours—wage elasticities at
the minimum, mean and maximum prime—age male unemployment rates in the period
l951480 are shown in Table 1. These are based upon the estimated ai and
shown in columns (2) and (5) of Table 3. Not surprisingly, because of the small
and insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms between wages and prime—
age male unemployment, there is relatively little variation in the wage elasti-
cities with changes in unemployment. It is noteworthy, though, that despite the-11—
Table3
Estimates of Employment and Hours Demand,UnitedStates Manufacturing,
1954 —1980:11
Employment Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6)
-.246 -.268 -.557 -.342 -.322 -.76'
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TI1'IE —.0042 —.0032 —.0034 —.0057 —.0049 —.0038
(—7.54) (—2.69) (—4.99) (—10.59) (—3.61)(—5.3)
TIME, From 1973:IV .00054 .00013
(1.23) (.21)
.00753 .00737 .00718 .00978 .00946 .00914
p .91t .93 .86 .86 .84 .62
(29.50)(25.42) (11.27) (17.24) (16.16) (8.03)-18-
Table
Wage Elasticities of Employment and Hours,
Based on Table 3, Equations (2) and (5)
TillMinimum Mean Maximum
(1.5 percent) (3.50 percent) (6.3percent)
Initial Response
Employment —.i68 —.196 —.236
hours -.232 —.263 -.301
LongRun Response
Employment —.295 —.333 —.385
Hours -.356 -.00 _.162—19—
failure to confirm the VEE hypothesis on this data set, the estimates make sense
in one respect. The initial responses of hours to changes in wage rates are
proportionately closer to the long—run responses than are the employment—wage
elasticities; this is consistent with employers varying hours/worker more
rapidly than they lay off or hire additional workers.
Though the results are not much different from those in many of the studies
sumniarized in Hamermesh (1916), the labor—demand elasticities are far below
those estimated by Clark—Freeman (1980) using almost the same series but ending
early in 1916. To examine what causes this discrepancy equation (io) was reesti—
mated with the addition of an extra time trend for quarters after 1973:111 and
a dummy variable for that period interacted with both the lagged wage and
output terms. The results are shown in columns (3) and (6) of Table 3. In
addition to the reduced rate of productivity growth implicit in the coefficient
on the post-1973 time trend, we see a large and nearly significant reduction in
the employment—wage elasticity, and a larger significant reduction in the hours—
wage elasticity. Moreover, in estimates not reported in the table, these fin—
dings varied little when the real wholesale price of energy and fuels was added
to the equations. The implied wage elasticities before and after 1973:111 were
—.439 and —.296 for employment, and -.596 and —.429 for hours.(The coef-
ficients on energy prices were positive with t—statistics slightly
above one.9)In addition to the well—established reduction in the rate of
growth of labor productivity since 1973, the U.S. has apparently also seen a
decline in the wage elasticity of labor demand, holding output and other factor
prices constant. For some reason independent of the price of energy there was a—20--
structural change in the U.S. economy that increased labor-market rigidity by
reducing employers' responses to changes in real wages.
IV. Time—Series Labor Demand in the United Kingdom, 1960—l98
Although we failed to find evidence for the VEE hypothesis in the U.S.
times series, it may nonetheless be the case that the hypothesis does better in
describing labor demand over time in other countries. In this section we exa-
mine the evidence for manufacturing in the United Kingdom since 1959. The basic
equation to be estimated is identical to (10); this is done both for com-
parability, and because the four—quarter lags embodied in (10) described the
British data better than did lags of other lengths. As with U.S. manufacturing
the model is estimated using unconstrained polynomial distributed lags and
assuming a first—order autoregression of the disturbances.
Employment is measured as the number of employees in manufacturing, while
manhours are calculated as employment times average hours worked per manufac-
turing operative. The wage measure is the basic weekly wage rate of manual
workers in manufacturing times the ratio of wages plus employer—paid national
insurance contributions to wages, all divided by the wholesale price index for
manufactured products. Q is measured as industrial production in manufacturing.
Theratio of unemployed persons other than school—leavers to the sum of
total employment plus unemployed other than school—leavers forms UXL, the
unemploymentrate used in this section. Unlike so may time—series studies of
labor demand, these data do not offer the easy task of "explaining" one variable
with a time trend by another with a similar trend: Employment in manufacturing
in the U.K. reached a peak in this period in 1965:IV.—21—
Estimates of the basic equations for employment and hoursare presented in
columns(i) and ()ofTable 5. The wage elasticities are not dissimilarto
those found for the United States (over aslightly longer time period); and the
estimatedrates of change in productivity grow-thperperson or per hour are
remarkablysimilar in the twocountries.The only difficulty with these estimates
is that the implied degree of increasing returnsto scale is implausibly high.
In the second and fifth columns of Table 5weshow the results of esti-
mating (io) with the interaction of UXL andwages, along with terms in UXL
itself. The interaction terms are positive andsignificant, providing strong
support for the VEE hypothesis in these data. Howimportant this effect is can
beseen by examining the values of the initial andlong—run wage elasticities
shownin Table 6.Thelong—run elasticities at the lowest unemployment rate
observedare over three times those at the highestunemployment rate, both for
employment and for hours. Allthelong—run responses are smaller when
unemployment is higher, though for employment the differencesare small.
As in the previous section, we test here forthe existence of an
unexplained decline in the labor—demand elasticity in theearly 1910s. Again we
adda separate time trend after 1973:111 and a dummyvariable for quarters after
then interacted with the laggedwage and output measures. The results
are shown in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5.10Though the trend term in
the employment equation is essentiallyzero, we find in this equation too the
presence of a significant decline in the employment—wageelasticity. (When the
real price of fuels and materials isadded, the only changes in the estimated—22—
Table5
Estimatesof Errloyment and Hours Demand, United Kingdom anufacturing,
196o—1978/
Employment Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
-.179 -.325 -.32)4 .33)4-.)46 -.056





Q(a3i) .421 .099 .480 .498 .174 .785





TI)IE —.0037 —.0011 —.0031 —.00)42 —.0009 —.0085
(—9.71) (—1.64)(—5.92) (—8.68) (—5.43) (—9.26)
TINE, From 1913:IV + .00001 .0057
(.02) (5.30)
.0062)4 .00377 .00575 .01)416 .01111 .01088
p .72 .93 .66 .33 .67 .35
(9.00)(21.55)(7.70) (2.88) (7.38) (3.09)
11962—1978for hours demand.—23—
Table 6
WageElasticities of Employment, United Kingdom, Based
on Table 5, Equations (2) and (5)
UXL = Minimum Mean Maximum
(1.27 percent) (2.90 percent) (6.06percemt)
Initial Response
Employment —.077 .228 .535
Hours —.029 —.170 .0)414
Long Run Response
Employment _.27'L —.209 —.082
Hours —.421 —.350 —.212wage elasticities are in the third digit.) In the hours equation, though,
the time trend is positive and significant, suggesting a sharp reduction in the
rate of productivity growth per manhour; and the wageelasticityis actually
greater (though not significantly so) after 1973:111. Though the evidence is
weaker here, there is some sign in the U.K. too of an unexplained increase in
therigidity of employment demand in response to changes in real wages.
V. Conclusions and Implications
If unemployment is to be explained by spillovers from product demand onto
labor demand when prices are flexible, the adverse shift in the labor demand
curvemust be accompanied by a low elasticity of labor demand. We have shown
that the existence of constraints in the output market (such that individual
firms act as if they face downward sloping demand curves) can be expected to
lead to similar movements in the level and elasticity of labor demand. This
will appear as a negative correlation between the (absolute value of) the wage
elasticity of demand for labor and the unemployment rate.
This hypothesis has been tested on three sets of data: i) For low—skilled
workers in the United States in 1969, there is weak support for this hypothesis;
2) In time—series data for the U.S. there is no evidence for this
(there is essentially no cyclical variability in the elasticity); and 3) In
time—series data for the United Kingdom there is fairly strong evidence sup-
porting the hypothesis. We have also found that, in both the U.S. and the U.K.,
the demand elasticity for labor decreased in the 1970s to an extent that does not
appear to be explained by failure to include changes in other factor prices.—25—
Theview of unemployment as a spillover due to firms facing downward—
sloping demand curves has strong implications for macro—economic policy (see
Drazen1980b), and these can in turn be used for labor—market policy. Consider
spillovers in a general equilibrium framework. Workers who expect a constraint
on future sales of labor will cut their current consumption. Firms facing this
inward shift in product demand curves cut labor demand in turn. Hence, indivi-
dual behavior may be seen as generating an externality. If some outside agency
were to act as a t'buyer of last resort,t' this externality would be eliminated,
since individual sellers could then act as if they faced horizontal demand
curves. The novelty is that ifgovernmentannounced its willingness to buy at
Wairasian prices, it conceivably need never make good on this promise ——since
individual competitive behavior would lead to a full employment equilibrium. A
guaranteed jobs program thus takes on a rationale beyond that of income
redistribution. What is important is not that the program provide jobs, but
that it provides a framework that enables the private sector to operate on the
assumption that demand curves are horizontal. It is the expectation that nulli-
fies thespillovers that may result in an unemployment equilibrium.
Thepartial empirical support for the variable employment elasticity (VEE)
hypothesis may be useful in the construction of wage subsidies. Though such sub-
sidies may work well as general macro stimuli, our results suggest they are not
likely to be so effective in times of high unemployment as commonly estimated
demand elasticities would imply. This means that their attractiveness should be
judged on their ease of administration and the speed with which they can be
implemented. One should not expect them to induce much short—run substitution
toward labor when product and labor markets are slack.—26—
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Footnotes
iFor a survey of quantity constrained models with and without rigid prices, see
Drazen (1980a).
2This maybecompared to the Hicks-Allen formulation of the determinants of the
elasticity of factor demand (Hicks, 196)4, andAllen,1938, p. 373). They
assumed that the firm is a perfect competitor, setting price equal to marginal
cost, but that its decisions affect price via the industry demand curve. Yeung
(1972) has derived a formula similar to (9)andanalogous to that of Hicks and
Allen, for the case of a monopolist maximizing profits over a single period.
3See Crandall et al (1975) for a more detailed description of how the data were
calculated. The state unemploment data are from Manpower Report of the
President, 1971, Table D—14.
Presumab1y the level of unemployment in the cross—section reflects at least
partlya permanent condition to which the market has adjusted through compen-
sating wage differentials. For some evidence on this see Abowd and Ashenfelter
(1981).
5Usedas instruments are variables representing output; age, race and sex com-
position of secondary and primary workers in the state; marital status andedu-
cationalattainment of these two groups of workers; fraction of workers in
urban areas, and number of families in the state. In addition, in the equations
that include the interaction, UDEY is also included in the set of instruments
used to predict WL.
6Hamermesh(1976) infers these conclusions from studies done before 1975;
Clark—Freeman (1980) demonstrate others of these results, and Solow (1980) traces
the development of thinking on this issue.
7Tinsley (1971) is the only study of which we are aware that examines any type
of variation over time in employment—demand elasticities.
8As in Clark—Freeman (1980) the addition of terms in the price of capital did
not affect the results qualitatively.
9When the equations involving UM were reestimated for 1954—1973:III to avoid
any post—OPEC effects, the results differed little from those in columns (2) and
(5)ofTable 3.
'-°The equations that included UXL were reestimated for 1960—1973:111 (1962—1973:
III for hours). The results for the employment equation changed little, but the
interaction term of UXL with W became negative (thoughwith a t—statistic of
—.21)in the hours equation.—28—
Appendix
In this appendix we show how the elasticity formulas presented in thetext
are derived. Totally differentiating equations (3)—(6), we obtain:
—x' —' m dp
ax'f, 0bf bf d dw
ax'f 0 bf bf d2 dw m 9,m nun m
ax' —â' 0 0 dm 0
Using Cramer's Rule, we may solve for .Weobtain:
(a + â)bf + aaf = mm m
,(A.1)
(a + â)b2 (f—f2)+ab(ff —2ff f + f2f ) £Qm nm £mm mu
where:
2 a= 2(x) —xx
",""I, a=2(x)—xx
(x )
and b =x/x'+ p.
If the production function is homogeneous of degreeone, (A.l) can be
simplified to (see Allen, 1938):
(a + )bf + af2 mm m
Wu (—abf2fu)/'m—29—
(a+)f f mm in (A.2)
a f2f /9gm bf2f /9m
2,m
f2,f Using the fact that the elasticity of substitution a = m
if f is linear
2m
homogeneous, the second term becomes:
finm .a.P
f w




w , w —r .Px .X.1 .p .X.1 —a
pf x f ax'
f2, f '
Since =1— and =1— wherefl =— andanalogously for
f, using the definitions K=and1 —K = - , weobtain:
w w ax ax
from which equations (8) and (9) in the text follow immediately.